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I. Introduction
In 2016, medical malpractice claimed more than 250,000 lives, making it
the nation’s third-leading cause of death behind heart disease and cancer.1 Despite
such startling statistics, many professions and organizations in the United States
advocate for medical malpractice reform, arguing that frivolous lawsuits have
created a medical malpractice crisis.2 Ascaris Mayo’s and Dr. Shelby Wilbourn’s
juxtaposed stories illustrate the forty-year debate between reformers and preservers,
physicians and doctors, and republicans and democrats.3
Ascaris Mayo went to Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital in Wisconsin when she
began experiencing abdominal pain and a high fever.4 The attending physician’s
assistant considered the possibility of infection in his diagnosis, but Ascaris was
not informed about the possible diagnosis or the available antibiotic treatment.5
Rather, Ascaris was told to follow-up with her gynecologist because of her history
of uterine fibroids.6 After being discharged from St. Mary’s, Ascaris went to a
different hospital because her symptoms worsened.7 There, Ascaris was diagnosed
with septic infection.8 Ascaris became comatose and developed gangrene in all
four extremities, which later required amputation of her arms and legs.9 A jury
found that the doctors at St. Mary’s failed to properly inform Ascaris of the
availability of antibiotics and awarded her $15 million for her pain, suffering,
and disfigurement.10 At the time of litigation, Wisconsin had a statute limiting
noneconomic damages to $750,000.11 The defendants moved to reduce the

Chad Terhune, Top Republicans say there’s a medical malpractice crisis. Experts say there isn’t,
The Washington Post, Dec. 30, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/
wp/2016/12/30/top-republicans-say-theres-a-medical-malpractice-crisis-experts-say-thereisnt/?utm_term=.9c8bc76a0b0f.
1

2

See infra notes 50 – 60 and accompanying text.

3

See infra notes 4–21 and accompanying text.

Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 2017 WI App 52, ¶ 2, 377 Wis.
2d 566, 571, 901 N.W.2d 782, 785.
4

5

Id.

Id. Uterine fibroids are “smooth muscle growths” that form on the uterus. Rebecca
L. Van Court, Note, Uterine Fibroids and Women’s Right to Choose, 26 J. Legal Med. 507, 508
(2005). Typical symptoms include “heavy, prolonged periods, pelvic pain, pain in the back or legs,
pain during sexual intercourse, bladder pressure, pressure on the bowel, and an abnormally large
abdomen.” Id. at 508−09.
6

7

Mayo, 2017 WI App 52 at ¶ 2.

8

Id.

9

Id.

10

Id. at ¶ 5.

Id. at ¶ 1. The applicable statute defined noneconomic damages as an award “intended to
compensate for pain and suffering; humiliation; embarrassment; worry; [or] mental distress.” Wis.
Stat. § 893.55 (2007) (held unconstitutional by Mayo, 2017 WI App 52 at ¶ 2.
11
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jury award accordingly.12 When applied to Ascaris’s case, the cap would reduce
Ascaris’s award by over ninety-five percent.13 This is the harsh reality for medical
malpractice plaintiffs in thirty-three states nationwide.14
Conversely, Dr. Shelby Wilbourn is an obstetrics and gynecology specialist
(Ob/Gyn) who practiced in Nevada for twelve years.15 In his private practice,
Dr. Wilbourn performed approximately 205 deliveries per year.16 Although Dr.
Wilbourn had never been sued in his practicing capacity, he was informed that
his medical malpractice insurance premiums were going to increase from $33,000
to $108,000 in one year if he kept performing that many annual deliveries.17 Dr.
Wilbourn had three options: retire, relocate, or reduce the number of patients he
treated.18 One additional, albeit laughable, option was for Dr. Wilbourn to borrow
$100,000 per year to cover his insurance premiums and hope the premiums
would someday decrease.19 Dr. Wilbourn ultimately chose to relocate.20 When he
left Nevada, Dr. Wilbourn said:
[His] patients, many of whom were with [him] for 12 years, were
forced to find another Ob/Gyn, among a dwindling population
of Ob/Gyns in Las Vegas. This is the real issue. Patients around
the country are losing access to good doctors and quality health
care. The end game of the current system is a society without
enough doctors to take care of its citizens.21
12

Mayo, 2017 WI App 52 at ¶ 6.

Id. at ¶ 43. The jury awarded Ascaris and her husband $16.5 million: $15 million awarded
to Ascaris and $1.5 million to Ascaris’s husband for loss of society and companionship. Id. at ¶ 5.
Fortunately for Ascaris and her family, the Court held the $750,000 cap on noneconomic damages
facially unconstitutional and upheld Ascaris’s $16.5 million noneconomic damage award. Id. at
¶ 29. Unfortunately, many plaintiffs do not get the same result. See Zdrojewski v. Murphy, 657
N.W.2d 721, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (holding statute capping noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases withstood constitutional scrutiny); Chan v. Curran, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59,
81−82 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st. Dist. 2015) (finding plaintiff ’s attack on MICRA’s noneconomic damage
caps to be unpersuasive).
13

14

See infra note 67.

Examining the Status of Patient Access to Quality Health Care, Focusing on the Role of Medical
Litigation and Malpractice Reform: Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the
S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 108th Cong. 17 (2003) (statement of Dr. Shelby
Wilbourn, Am. Coll. of Obstetrics and Gynecology) [hereinafter Hearings].
15

16

Id.

Id. The $108,000 figure was conditional on Dr. Wilbourn delivering no more than 125
deliveries in one year. Id. The thresholds are unexplained, though conjecture lends itself to the idea
that insurance companies believed more than 125 deliveries in one year was too risky to insure at
the $108,000 amount. See id.
17

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id. at 18.

21

Id.
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This is the harsh reality for physicians and patients in a growing number of states.22
The juxtaposed realities illustrated in Ascaris’s and Dr. Wilbourn’s stories helped
spur the debate surrounding the medical malpractice “crisis” and set lawmakers
on a quest for a solution that has yet to be found.23 The solution, regardless of
the outcome, will have serious consequences for Americans. Historically, the
resolution seemed unlikely to result from congressional action.24 However, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act) pushed health
care and its associated costs to the center of the national stage, causing some legal
scholars to argue for full federalization of medical malpractice law.25
Part II of this Comment provides background on the medical malpractice
debate, including the ostensible medical malpractice “crisis,” the arguments
concerning the debate, and state responses to the alleged crisis.26 Part III
summarizes the formidable attempts by Congress to preempt states in this area,
highlighting the Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 (PACA) as the current
congressional attempt.27 PACA is particularly controversial because of its
treatment limiting noneconomic damages, which are “damages for physical and
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental anguish,
disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship . . . ,
hedonic damages, injury to reputation,” and any other nonpecuniary damages.28
Despite its controversial provisions, PACA’s passage is imminent given the current
political environment.29 Accordingly, Part IV analyzes PACA in the context of
preemption.30 “Preemption is a doctrine of American constitutional law under
which state and local governments are deprived of their power to act” in a certain
area of law.31 Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,
a state law that conflicts with federal law is without effect.32 Part IV illustrates
22

See id.

23

See infra notes 87– 89 and accompanying text.

Michael Matray, Are Federal Caps on Noneconomic Damages Possible Under a Republican
Government?, C unningham  G roup , https://www.cunninghamgroupins.com/federal-capsnoneconomic-damages-possible-republican-government/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2017) (“Attempts to
enact federal noneconomic damage caps have proven fruitless because they face resistance from
Democrats as well as the more-conservative members of the Republican Party.”).
24

25
Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the Medical Malpractice
“Crisis”, 23 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 477, 491 (2012).
26

See infra notes 43 –70 and accompanying text.

27

See infra notes 71–95 and accompanying text.

28

H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. § 7(13) (2017).

29

See infra notes 96 –107 and accompanying text.

30

See infra notes 108 –26 and accompanying text.

James T. O’Reilly, Federal Preemption of State and Local law: Legislation, Regulation
Litigation 1 (2006).
31

and

Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). When a state law conflicts with federal
law, it is often referred to as conflict preemption. William W. Buzbee, Preemption Choice:
32
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how the seventeen states that have not limited noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice suits are in conflict with PACA’s objectives and will be
preempted on that basis.33
Given the imminent passage of PACA and subsequent preemption of
state laws, Part V proposes three options for states facing preemption.34 This
Comment argues preempted states should adopt the sovereign concession
approach because it aligns more closely with the objectives of tort law.35 This
option first requires states to concede to preemption by accepting the implicit
PACA requirement that there be a cap on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice cases.36 In some states, this may require a constitutional amendment.37
Once legislation of this nature is constitutionally permissible, the sovereign
concession approach requires an imposition of a cap that exceeds $1,136,263,
the modern day valuation of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA) limitation amount, and accounts for inflation.38 Additionally, sovereign
concession statutes should exempt cases resulting in death or disfigurement
and categorically exempt nursing homes.39 Such statutes should also work in
tandem with an active Plaintiff Compensation Fund (PCF) to ensure additional
compensation will be available if necessary.40 Wyoming is used as an example
throughout Section V because Wyoming will have one of the more challenging
journeys following preemption given its constitutional provision prohibiting
limitations on damages41 and its inactive PCF.42

II. Background
A. Medical Malpractice Reform
Medical malpractice is a subset of tort law but, unlike traditional negligence torts, medical malpractice claims require a showing of a health care
The Theory, Law, and Reality of Federalism’s Core Question 125 (2009); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law Principles and Policies 435 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds.,
5th ed. 2015). There are, however, other ways to find preemption. See id. at 411−34.
33

See infra notes 109–26 and accompanying text.

34

See infra notes 127–208 and accompanying text.

35

See infra notes 168 –208 and accompanying text.

36

See infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.

37

See infra note 70 and accompanying text.

38

See infra notes 128 –48 and accompanying text.

39

See infra notes 180 –91 and accompanying text.

40

See infra notes 192–208 and accompanying text.

41

Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4(a).

Frank. A. Sloan et al., Public Medical Malpractice Insurance: An Analysis of State-Operated
Patient Compensation Funds, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 247, 249 (2005) (“Wyoming’s legislature passed
a statute creating a PCF, but it was never formally created in practice.”). See also Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§ 26-33-105 (2008) (the statute creating Wyoming’s Medical Liability Compensation Account).
42
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provider-patient relationship.43 The objectives of medical malpractice are “to
increase the quality of healthcare through deterrence of future incidences of
malpractice and to provide sufficient redress for injuries resulting from actual
negligence.”44 The frequency of medical malpractice claims began to rise in
the 1960s because of a changing legal landscape that provided plaintiffs with
more opportunities to successfully bring medical malpractice actions.45 Such
opportunities allegedly increased both the number of excess jury awards and
the price of medical malpractice insurance premiums, ultimately causing some
practitioners to leave the market and others to practice without insurance.46 Loss
of insurance coverage and higher premiums was a springboard for public and
political outcry by physicians, birthing the mid-1970s “insurance crisis.” 47
The medical malpractice insurance “crisis” is still heavily debated.48 Although
tort law has traditionally been a state law area, medical malpractice reform has
increasingly become the focal point of national debates concerning both the cause
and the solution of the medical malpractice “crisis.” 49

43

61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 285 (2004).

Kyle Miller, Note, Putting the Caps on Caps: Reconciling the Goal of Medical Malpractice
Reform with the Twin Objectives of Tort Law, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1470 (2006).
44

45
See MICRA: A Brief History, Cal. Med. Assoc., http://www.cmanet.org/issues-andadvocacy/cmas-top-issues/micra/micra-a-brief-history/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2017). The commonality
of the medical malpractice claim can be attributed to advances in medical technology, which resulted
in higher-risk treatments, a changing legal landscape sparked by the removal of previously imposed
regulations that shielded charitable institutions from suit, and a general decline in satisfaction with
the healthcare industry. Joseph S. Kass, Medical Malpractice Reform, 18 [J]AMA of Ethics 299,
March 2016, http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2016/03/pfor6-1603.html.
46

MICRA: A Brief History, supra note 45.

Id. In the mid-1970s, anesthesiologists and surgeons in California saw their insurance
premiums triple, causing practitioners to refuse “to handle any patients except those in imminent
danger of death.” Id.; see also Glen O. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970’s: A
Retrospective, 49 L. & Contemp. Probs. 5 (1986). The “insurance crisis” refers to the situation where
the amount of medical malpractice awards are believed to be steadily and dramatically increasing,
making it difficult to insure physicians. David N. Hoffman, The Medical Malpractice Insurance
Crisis, Again, 35 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 15, 15 (2005). This situation is exacerbated because “fewer
dollars [are] available to pay for doctor’s malpractice settlements and judgments” and it is impossible
for physicians to place the additional cost on their patients. Id. at 17.
47

48

See Hearings, supra note 15.

See Fred Charatan, Bush pushes for limit to medical malpractice awards, Nat’l Inst. of
Health (Jan. 22, 2005), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC545016/. In 2005,
President George W. Bush asked Congress to impose a $250,000 limitation for noneconomic
damages because “doctors should be focused on fighting illnesses, not on fighting lawsuits.” Id.; see
also Y. Peter Kang, Bar Association Urges Congress to Reject Tort Reform Bill, Law360 (June 13, 2017,
7:19 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/934039/bar-association-urges-congress-to-reject-tortreform-bill; see infra notes 87– 89 and accompanying text.
49
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Proponents of medical malpractice reform are generally physicians,50
defense lawyers,51 and Republicans.52 Proponents blame the civil litigation
system for the “crisis,” believing “medical errors [are not] a problem when
compared to the problem of frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits.”53 Excessive
litigation and mega-jury awards make insurance premiums unaffordable,
according to proponents.54 They argue that, when premiums are unaffordable,
practitioners either quit practicing or move to states with lower premiums.55
The result, according to proponents, is an urgent patient-access crisis where
patients have trouble finding treatment.56 Proponents also blame juries for the
increased premiums.57 They argue juries are too biased against doctors and too
incompetent to decide complex technical issues, and award heightened damages
simply because they assume doctors can afford to pay the bill.58 Because
proponents believe the problem stems from excessive litigation and incompetent,
overly-sympathetic juries, one offered solution is to cap noneconomic damage
awards.59 Proponents believe such a cap provides greater predictability in jury
verdicts and creates more stability in the insurance market.60

Andrew Jay McClurg, Fight Club: Doctors vs. Lawyers – A Peace Plan Grounded in SelfInterest, 83 Temp. L. Rev. 309, 352 n.283 (2011). One member of the American Medical Association
proposed a resolution to the House of Delegates that would allow doctors to stop providing medical
services to medical malpractice plaintiff ’s lawyers and their families. James W. Jones et al., Ethics of
Refusal to Treat Patients as a Social Statement, 40 J. of Vascular Surgery 1057, 1057 (2004).
50

51
See Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decision Making About General Damages: A Comparison of
Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 751 (1999). According to one defense lawyer, “there’s
no limit on what jurors can award for pain and suffering, so too often they act like Santa Claus,
handing out millions of dollars in cases involving comparatively minor injuries.” Id. at 804 n.155
(quoting James Griffith, What it Will Take to Solve the Malpractice Crisis, Med. Econ., Sept. 1982,
at 195).
52
See Stuart L. Weinstein, Medical Liability Reform Crisis 2008, Nat’l Inst. of Health (Nov.
7, 2008), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2628503/ (stating “[i]n 2005, President
George W. Bush made tort reform, particularly medical liability, his highest priority.”).

See Williams, supra note 25, at 487. “One-third of surveyed physicians named medical
malpractice lawsuits and medical malpractice insurance as the two biggest problems in healthcare, but
only 5% listed medical errors resulting in patient injuries as the biggest problem in healthcare.” Id.
53

54

Hearings, supra note 15, at 2.

Id. at 39 (statement of Senator Enzi). Senator Enzi noted that a doctor in Wheatland,
Wyoming had to quit practicing because his insurance premiums exceeded $150,000. Id.
55

56

Id. at 1.

57

Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury 7 (1995).

58

Id.

See H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. (2017). Capping noneconomic damages is only one solution.
Id. For example, PACA has provisions reducing statute of limitations periods, limiting attorney
contingency fees, and governing expert witness testimony and qualifications. Id.
59

Joanna M. Shepherd, Tort Reforms’ Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and
Activity Levels, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 905, 916 (2008).
60
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In response, opponents suggest tougher regulation of the insurance industry,
not a restraint on the civil justice system.61 Opponents also put forth constitutional
arguments based on Seventh, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendment grounds.62
Arguments against reform also highlight the potential of increased marginalization
of women, the elderly, and the poor, claiming meritorious plaintiffs in these
demographics will be unable to justify the cost and risk of pursuing legal redress
if there are low noneconomic damage limitations.63

B. State Responses to the Medical Malpractice “Crisis”
The first wave of reforms in the mid-1970s contained general limitations
on noneconomic damages with rigid thresholds.64 Recent legislative enactments
include more complex initiatives such as higher caps for egregious injuries and
61
See Alexander Tabarrok & Amanda Agan, Medical Malpractice Awards, Insurance, and
Negligence: Which Are Related?, Manhattan Inst. (May 1, 2006), https://www.manhattan-institute.
org/html/medical-malpractice-awards-insurance-and-negligence-which-are-related-5890.html
(“A commonly stated alternative is that insurance companies are gouging doctors and hospitals
for treatment and pharmaceutical companies are charging outrageous prices for prescriptions.”);
Hearings, supra note 15, at 5; Tom Baker, An Excerpt from The Medical Malpractice Myth, The
University of Chicago Press, http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/036480.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2017) (declaring the real problem is too much medical malpractice, not too
much litigation).

See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damage Caps,
80 NYU L. Rev. 391, 413 (2005). The Seventh Amendment argument claims legislation on the
matter will violate a plaintiff ’s right to a jury trial by taking away the determination of the award
from the jury. Mark A Behrens & Carly Silverman, The Constitutional Foundation for Federal Medical
Liability Reform, 15 J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 173, 184−85 (2012); see also Boyd v. Bulala, 877
F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Amendment argument claims medical malpractice reform
and tort litigation are rights reserved to the states and should remain that way. Julian Pequet, GOP
Clashes Over Medical Malpractice, The Hill (Feb. 2, 2011, 2:03 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/
healthwatch/state-issues/143009-tea-party-influence-sparks-gop-clash-over-tort-reform?tmpl=co
mponent&print=1&page=. The Fourteenth Amendment argument claims caps on noneconomic
damages discriminates between plaintiffs in medical malpractice suits and plaintiffs in other areas
of tort law. Todd M. Kossow, Note, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group: Future Trends in Damage
Limitation Adjudication, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1643, 1664 (1986).
62

63
Michael L. Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected: The Impact of Noneconomic Damage Caps
on Meritorious Nursing Home Lawsuits, 14 Elder L.J 331, 360 (2006) [hereinafter Neglecting the
Neglected] (“Because elderly plaintiffs have no loss of past, present, or future earnings, and little by
way of special damages, the typical nursing home case is not cost-effective without the possibility
of noneconomic damages.”). This is also true for the poor and some women who may not have
sufficient past, present, or future earnings to justify taking on the costs of medical malpractice
cases. Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 15, at 62 (statement of Linda McDougal) (Linda McDougal
went for a routine mammogram and was told she had breast cancer. With her doctors and family,
Linda decided to undergo a double mastectomy to maximize her time alive. Forty-eight hours
after surgery, Linda was informed she did not have breast cancer. The pathologist had switched
Linda’s biopsy slides with another patient’s. Linda’s lost wages were approximately $8,000 and her
hospital expenses were $48,000. The lost wages and medical expenses were categorized as economic
damages. However, to Linda, her loss was “almost entirely noneconomic.”).
64

Sharkey, supra note 62, at 413.
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sliding scale amounts for limitations.65 The newer legislative models are largely
attributable to courts striking down blanket damage caps in a number of states.66
There are currently thirty-three states that limit noneconomic damages in
medical malpractice cases.67 In those states, the limitation ranges from $250,000
to $770,000, with less than a handful of states accounting for inflation or
providing exceptions for catastrophic incidents.68 Seventeen states do not cap
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases.69 Of those states, eight states
have constitutional provisions prohibiting such caps.70

III. Nationalized Tort Law?
Past and Present Congressional Attempts
Presently, states choose whether to adopt limitations or expand tort laws
based on their own jurisdictional needs.71 The concept of nationalized tort law
introduces a one-size-fits-all federal approach where states will be unable to tailor
solutions to state problems unless the solutions align with the federal agenda.72
Despite the recognized importance of noneconomic damages at common law,
Congress has introduced numerous pieces of legislation to limit noneconomic
damages over the last forty years.73 In 1975, California enacted MICRA,74 which
has heavily influenced these repetitive attempts at federal legislation.75 This
65

Id.

Id. (“These exceptions and sliding scales were included, at least in part, because blanket
damage caps were previously struck down as unconstitutional in Florida, Ohio, and Texas.”).
66

Med. Malpractice Ctr., http://malpracticecenter.com/legal/damage-caps (last visited
Oct. 30, 2017). Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
67

68

Id.

Id. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
69

70
Id. Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and
Wyoming. Ariz. Const. art. XVIII, § 6; Ark. Const. art. II, § 13; Ky. Const. § 54; N.Y. Const.
art. I, § 16; Ohio Const. art. I, § 19a; Okla. Const. art XXIII, § 7; Penn. Const. art. III, § 18;
Wyo. Const. art. X, § 4(a).

Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue
Collar Workers, and Consumers, 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 673, 683 n.32 (1996) [hereinafter The
Republican Attack].
71

72

Id.

73

See infra notes 87– 89 and accompanying text.

See Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2 (West 1975). The statute limits noneconomic damages to
$250,000. Id.
74

Matray, supra note 24 (“Since its enactment, [MICRA] has been the gold standard of
medical liability tort reform legislation.”).
75
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section provides a brief description of MICRA and the congressional attempts to
nationalize tort law in this area.

A. Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA): What is it and
Why Does Congress View it as a Basis for Proposed Legislation?
In the mid-1970s, California experienced a self-proclaimed medical
malpractice insurance crisis when a high amount of malpractice litigation
allegedly increased insurance premiums to record levels.76 In response, some
insurance companies determined medicine was no longer an insurable risk,
which caused a number of insurance providers to exit the market.77 In some
geographic and practice areas, insurance premiums more than tripled, causing
practitioners, including anesthesiologists and surgeons, to deny treatment to some
patients.78 Such circumstances motivated the California Medical Association to
lead a grassroots campaign to raise awareness of the crisis amongst the public.79
Eventually, the California legislature enacted MICRA in an attempt to reduce the
burden of high insurance premiums.80
MICRA limits noneconomic damage awards to $250,000.81 Proponents
praise the effects of MICRA, which has led to its national recognition and
modeling in subsequent legislative proposals.82 Some empirical studies of MICRA
have shown that:
[B]etween 1976 and 2002, malpractice premiums in California
rose 235 percent, while premiums in the rest of the country
rose more than 750 percent. Before MICRA was adopted,
California’s percentage of loss payments was significantly higher
than its proportion of physicians as compared to the rest of
the country. Since then, medical malpractice costs have fallen
substantially as a percentage of the U.S. total, while physician
residence in the state has held steady at approximately fifteen
percent of the U.S. total.83
76

MICRA: A Brief History, supra note 45.

Andrew F. Popper, Tort Reform—Commentary
(2010) (ebook).
77

78

MICRA: A Brief History, supra note 45.

79

Id.

80

Id.

and

Other Materials loc. 2856

Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2 (West 1975). Though not the focus of this Comment, MICRA
also limits attorney contingency fees, declares a short statute of limitations period, requires advance
notice of a claim, and provides for periodic payments for future damages, similar to PACA. Id.
81

82
Sharkey, supra note 62, at 394. MICRA has served as a model for the adoption of damage
caps in medical malpractice suits for state legislatures, Congress, and the White House. Id.
83

Popper, supra note 77, at loc. 2864.
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Conversely, some studies conclude MICRA has had an overall negligible effect on
health care costs and suggest that, if MICRA had solved the “crisis,” Californians
would not be advocating for recent federal healthcare reform.84
Nevertheless, because some empirical evidence suggests MICRA reduced
malpractice insurance premiums, many proponents push provisions of MICRA
on legislative proposals.85 This is evident in both the past and present congres
sional attempts to nationalize tort law, especially with regards to the $250,000
limitation on noneconomic damages.86

B. Past Congressional Attempts
During the first wave of medical malpractice reform in the 1970s, some
congressmen acknowledged the need to “explore the phenomenon of medical
malpractice lawsuits.”87 This exploratory phase led to the emergence of proposals
limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000.88 Despite a lack of empirical
data speaking directly to the overall effectiveness of state caps on noneconomic
damages, proposals for such caps have steadily increased over time and contain
more complex measures than their 1970s counterparts, including provisions
governing contingency fees and statute of limitation periods.89

84
Heather E. Stern, Healthcare Reform Should Not Follow MICRA’s Example, 33 L.A. Law.
60 (2010).

Matray, supra note 24 (“Since its enactment, [MICRA] has been the gold standard of
medical liability tort reform legislation.”).
85

S. 1936, 102nd Cong. (1991) (a bill limiting noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
suits to $250,000); e.g., S. 1770, 103rd Cong. (1993); H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a)
(1995); H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. (2017).
86

H.R. 5052, 93rd Cong. (1973) (a Republican bill to establish a commission on medical
malpractice awards); H.R. 6293, 94th Cong. (1975) (a Republican bill to establish a reinsurance
program for medical malpractice awards); S. 1720, 96th Cong. (1979) (a bill to investigate the
condition of malpractice insurance in America at the time); see also William J. Phelan, IV, Comment,
A Chronic Concern No More: How Federal Medical Malpractice Caps Will Survive Under the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, 23 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 168 (2006).
87

H.R. 2659, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. Res. 386, 99th Cong. (1986) (a resolution to reform
state tort law as to put caps on noneconomic losses in medical malpractice cases).
88

See supra notes 64 –66 and accompanying text. For example, in the early 1990s, Democrats
controlled both houses, but Republican Senator John Chaffee of Rhode Island introduced the
Health Equity and Access Improvement Act of 1991 and the Health Equity and Access Reform
Today Act of 1993. S. 1936, 102nd Cong. (1991); S. 1770, 103rd Cong. (1993). Both of Senator
Chaffee’s proposals primarily sought to limit noneconomic damages to $250,000. S. 1936 § 332(b);
S. 1770 § 4023(a).
89
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C. Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 (PACA): What is it and Why is it
Going to Pass?
1. What is PACA?
Most recently, the House passed PACA, largely along party lines, by a vote of
218 –210.90 PACA limits noneconomic damages91 to $250,000 in any applicable
suit and applies to virtually all aspects of medical malpractice, including surgical
errors, abuse and neglect in nursing homes, sexual assault by doctors, and side
effects from prescription drugs.92 With regard to noneconomic damages, PACA
will not preempt any state law:
[T]hat specifies a particular monetary amount of economic or
noneconomic damages (or the total amount of damages) that
may be awarded in a health care lawsuit, regardless of whether
such monetary amount is greater or lesser than is provided for
under this section and regardless of whether the state imposed
limitation is effective before, on, or after the date of enactment
of [PACA].93

Off. of the Clerk, U.S. H.R., Final Vote Results for Roll Call 337 (June 28, 2017),
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll337.xml. Nineteen Republicans and 191 Democrats opposed
the bill, with six members abstaining. Id. Wyoming Representative Liz Cheney voted in favor of
the legislation, despite a state constitutional provision prohibiting damage caps in personal injury
suits. Id.
90

H.R. 1215 § 4(e). As defined in the statute, the term noneconomic damages means
damages for “physical and emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental
anguish, disfigurement, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of society and companionship, loss of
consortium (other than loss of domestic service), hedonic damages, injury to reputation, and all
other nonpecuniary losses of any kind or nature incurred as a result of the provision or use of (or
failure to provide or use) health care services or medical products, unless otherwise defined under
applicable state law.” Id.
91

92
H.R. 1215 § 7(7). The legislation applies to all “health care lawsuit[s]” which is defined
as “any health care liability claim concerning the provision of goods or services for which coverage
was provided in whole or in part via a Federal program, subsidy or tax benefit, or any health care
liability action concerning the provision of goods or services for which coverage was provided in
whole or in part via a Federal program, subsidy or tax benefit, brought in a State or Federal court or
pursuant to an alternative dispute resolution system. . . .” Id. “Health care lawsuit” does not include
“a claim or action which is based on criminal liability; which seeks civil fines or penalties paid to
Federal, State, or local government; or which is grounded in antitrust.” Id. The bill includes other
familiar provisions from previous proposals, including limits on contingency fee arrangements and
a three-year statute of limitations period. Id.
93

Id. at § 3(e).
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Put another way, PACA will preempt any state law that does not satisfy this
criterion.94 This is an unprecedented incursion of federal law into a traditional
area of state sovereignty.95

2. Why is PACA Going to Pass?
There have been numerous proposals to rein in healthcare spending since
Republicans took control of both Congress and the White House.96 One such
proposal is PACA.97 Previous measures to limit noneconomic damages have
repeatedly failed in both the House and the Senate.98 There are some who believe
tort reform will never come to fruition and that PACA will stall or fail like its
predecessors.99 Others believe PACA will need to be part of larger legislation
before it will receive sixty votes in the Senate.100 Some opponents argue the repeal
and replace chaos surrounding the Affordable Care Act will push other phases
of Republican-proposed healthcare reform, such as PACA, to a lower priority.101
PACA is different than its predecessors, though. According to some
commentators, the difference in prior legislation is that “[l]urking in the
background was always a frustrating reality for supporters: Even if 60 votes could
be found to pass the bill, a veto threat by President Obama made Senate action
seem futile, especially with so many competing priorities.”102 The Senate may
94

See infra notes 109 –26 and accompanying text.

See Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Federalism: Whatever Happened to Devolution?, 14
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 429, 436 (1996) (discussing defamation as one area of tort law where the
Supreme Court has actively intervened). “[A]ssuming that these measures are a legitimate exercise
of Congress’s commerce power, there would appear to be little constitutional problem with the
fact that Congress would be altering the rules that have applied in the state courts. . . . Whether or
not such interventions are good policy is yet another matter. . . .” Id. Ultimately, passage of PACA
presents a substantial question of federalism. See id.
95

Meg Bryant, House narrowly passes malpractice reform legislation, Healthcare Dive (June
30, 2017), http://www.healthcaredive.com/news/house-narrowly-passes-malpractice-reformlegislation/446208/. In addition to PACA, there have been at least two other bills that advanced in
the House that prioritized doctors and corporations over plaintiffs. H.R. 985, 115th Cong. (2017)
(a bill requiring every person in a class action to suffer the same type and scope of alleged injury
before they can file); H.R. 720, 115th Cong. (2017) (a bill requiring mandatory sanctions on those
who file frivolous lawsuits); see also S. 237, 115th Cong. (2017) (companion proposal in the senate).
96

97
See Billy Corriher, The Other Terrible Health Care Bill Pending in Congress, Ctr.
Am. Progress (July 20, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/
2017/07/20/436343/terrible-health-care-bill-pending-congress/.

for

98

See supra notes 87– 89 and accompanying text.

See Andis Robeznieks, Senators may stall medical liability-reform legislation, AMA Wire,
July 12, 2017, https://wire.ama-assn.org/practice-management/senators-may-stall-medicalliability-reform-legislation.
99

100

Id.

101

Id.

Bruce Kaufman, Push to Enact Civil Justice Bills Follows Industry Playbook, Bloomberg
BNA (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.bna.com/push-enact-civil-n57982084551/.
102
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now be more inclined to pass PACA since President Trump will likely be advised
to sign it into law.103 Furthermore, PACA differs from previous attempts because
it provides more flexibility for states to keep past legislation or pass new legislation
so long as it limits noneconomic damages to some extent.104 Considering that
one of the reasons for prior opposition was distaste for preemption, the flexibility
contained in PACA’s provisions may give the assurance some congressmen need to
favor the bill.105 Additionally, some scholars have advocated for full federalization
of medical malpractice law considering the government is funding a significant
portion of health care subsidies.106 The federal government is projected to spend
$51 billion over a ten-year period on health care.107 Arguably, it is easier to swallow
the preemption pill when the federal government is spending significant amounts
of money on healthcare.

IV. Impending Preemption of Seventeen States108
The doctrine of preemption is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution.109 Under the Supremacy Clause, a state law that conflicts
with federal law is without effect.110 Nevertheless, judicial consideration of
preemption issues begins with “the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States [are] not to be superseded by . . . Federal Act unless that [is] the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.”111 Thus, Congress’s purpose is the “ultimate

103
The White House, H.R. 1215—Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 (June 14,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/06/14/hr-1215-%E2%80%93protecting-access-care-act-2017.
104

Robeznieks, supra note 99; see also H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. § 4(e) (2017).

105

See infra note 123 and accompanying text.

See Williams, supra note 25, at 491 (“However, as healthcare and its associated costs have
become national issues, and with the 2010 enactment of the [Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act], legal scholars have advocated full federalization of medical malpractice law.”).
106

See Cong. Budget Off., Health Care, https://www.cbo.gov/topics/health-care (last visited
Nov. 9, 2017).
107

This analysis only concerns preemption of noneconomic damage limitations in medical
malpractice claims. If a state caps damages only in medical malpractice suits, the state would
effectively adopt the cap of $250,000 for all other health care liability suits, including nursing homes.
Id.; Tatum O’Brien, H.R. 1215—an Anti-Justice Bill Limiting Recovery for those Injured in Healthcare
Cases, The Legal Examiner (June 27, 2017), http://fargo.legalexaminer.com/2017/06/27/h-r1215-an-anti-justice-bill-limiting-recovery-for-those-injured-in-healthcare-cases/.
108

U.S. Const. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
109

110
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516; Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981). For
alternative ways to find preemption, see Chemerinsky, supra note 32, at 411−34.
111

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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touchstone” of a preemption analysis.112 Congress’s purpose to preempt state law
may be demonstrated by either express or implied intent.113 Express intent occurs
when Congress’s intent is explicitly stated in a statute.114 Implied preemption
may occur when Congress’s intent to preempt state law is implicitly contained in
a statute’s structure and purpose.115 Preemptive intent may be inferred if the
state and federal law conflict with one another.116 This is often referred to as
conflict preemption.117
The starting point for a conflict preemption analysis is to determine the
federal objective.118 Then, the analysis turns on whether the determined federal
objective is inconsistent with a state law, creating discord between the two.119
The stated intent of PACA is “[t]o improve patient access to health care services
and provide improved medical care by reducing the excessive burden the liability
system places on the health care delivery system.”120 In terms of noneconomic
damage limitations, a state law will not be preempted if the state law limits
noneconomic damage awards in a health care lawsuit, regardless of whether
the limitation is greater or lesser than the $250,000 PACA amount.121 PACA
also allows qualified state legislation to be effective regardless of whether the
legislation is enacted before, on, or after the date of the enactment of PACA.122
These provisions imply that Congress intends for states to impose a cap on
noneconomic damage awards.123 Accordingly, any state that does not have a cap
on noneconomic damages directly conflicts with Congress’s objective of imposing
112

Retail Clerks Intern. Ass’n, Local 1625, AFL-CIO v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).

113

Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).

114

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).

115

Id.

116

Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008).

117

Buzbee, supra note 32, at 125; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 32, at 435.

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). To arrive at the preemption analysis, it must
first be determined that Congress has constitutional authority to legislate on the matter. See U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have power to . . . regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”); see also U.S. Const. amend. X (“The
powers not delegated to the United states by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”). However, health care is commonly considered
to implicate interstate commerce, granting Congress the authority to act. Ackerman, supra note 95,
at *439; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 545–51 (2012).
118

Amanda G. Lewis, Federal Preemption of State and Local Laws: State and Local Efforts to
Impose Sanctions on Employers of Unauthorized Aliens 6−7 (2008), http://web.law.columbia.edu/
sites/default/files/microsites/career-services/Federal%20Preemption%20of%20State%20and%20
Local%20Laws.pdf.
119

120

See also H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. (2017).

121

Id. at § 3(e).

122

Id.

H.R. 1215: Lawmakers looking out for citizens will vote NO, JDSupra (June 14, 2017),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/h-r-1215-lawmakers-looking-out-for-75522/. See also Congr.
Budget Office, Options for Reducing the Deficit: 2017 to 2026 (2016) (“When the bill has
123

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2018

15

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 18 [2018], No. 1, Art. 4

68

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 18

a cap in every state.124 This conflict requires states that do not have noneconomic
damage caps on or before the enactment of PACA to be preempted with the
$250,000 cap.125 The only way for states to stop federal preemption is to preempt
or circumvent the preemption by imposing their own caps.126

V. State Recommendations: Approaches to Preempt
or Circumvent Federal Preemption
Because PACA will preempt state laws in seventeen states, this Comment
describes three approaches preempted states can consider in dealing with federal
preemption. To ensure plaintiffs in preempted jurisdictions are protected when
preemption occurs, states should implement statutes following the guidelines set
forth in the sovereign concession approach. To do so, states need to either preempt
preemption by passing sovereign concession statutes before the enactment of
PACA, or circumvent preemption by passing sovereign concession statutes after
the enactment of PACA. The State of Wyoming is used as an example throughout
Section V because it will face significant challenges following preemption given
its constitutional provision prohibiting legislative limitations on damages and its
inactive PCF.127

A. The Dormant Approach
The most obvious response is to do nothing. A state that chooses this option
will effectively adopt PACA’s $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages.128 The
advantage of this option is an efficient use of legislative resources, meaning state
legislatures would not focus time on this specific area.129 However, states should
provisions regarding ‘State Flexibility’ these provision (sic) are in-fact preemption clauses, mandating
a strict federal regime that contradicts the decisions of state legislatures and state courts. Even CBO
has recognized this bill’s preemption of state law.”) See also id. (“Some people might oppose this
option because it would be a federal preemption of state laws.”).
124

See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text.

125

See supra notes 118–23 and accompanying text.

126

See infra notes 127–208 and accompanying text.

Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4(a) (“No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be
recovered for causing injury or death of any person.”). See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-33-105 (2008)
(creating the Medical Liability Compensation Account). The American Medical Association claims
Wyoming’s medical liability compensation account has never been implemented. Dean Gereau,
Basics of Patient Compensation Funds by State, Arthur J. Gallagher & Co. (Apr. 29, 2015), http://
www.gallaghermalpractice.com/blog/post/basics-of-patient-compensation-funds; Sloan, supra note
42, at 247.
127

128

H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. § 3(e) (2017).

See Stephen A. Spiller, Opportunity Cost Consideration, 38 J. of Consumer Res. 595,
595 (2011) (There are “unlimited wants but limited resources, so satisfying one want means not
satisfying another (the opportunity cost). An opportunity cost is the evaluation placed on the most
highly valued of the rejected alternatives or opportunities or the loss of another alternative when one
alternative is chosen.”) (quotations and citations omitted). When the legislature spends time on one
matter, it necessarily follows that they do not spend that time on other matters. See id.
129
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not respond with the dormant approach because PACA’s noneconomic damages
cap disregards the objectives of the medical malpractice liability system.130
The American medical malpractice liability system seeks “to increase the
quality of healthcare through deterrence of future incidences of malpractice and
to provide sufficient redress for injuries resulting from actual negligence.”131
Noneconomic damages help to achieve those objectives by compensating
plaintiffs and deterring tortious activity.132 Therefore, states need to ensure that
noneconomic damage limitations achieve the objectives of compensation and
deterrence, neither of which can be satisfied with a $250,000 ceiling.133 From a
compensation standpoint, the $250,000 threshold is unconscionably insufficient
to compensate most victims of medical malpractice.134 The $250,000 amount
stems from the 1975 enactment of MICRA and, for unexplained reasons, has
not been altered despite the forty-two-year separation between MICRA and
current legislative proposals.135 Today, the 1975 value of $250,000 is only worth
$55,004.136 If inflation is not accounted for, a damage cap becomes “a de facto
reduction in the award intended for the plaintiff by the trier-of-fact.”137 Refusing
to account for inflation effectively decreases buying power of each dollar the
longer inflation remains ignored. For example, the buying power of the 1975
MICRA value was reduced by nearly sixty-six percent by 1998.138 If the $250,000

130

See infra notes 131– 48 and accompanying text.

131

Miller, supra note 44, at 1470.

132

Shepherd, supra note 60, at 912.

133

See infra notes 134 – 48 and accompanying text.

134

See infra notes 135– 48 and accompanying text.

U.S. House Comm. on the Judiciary—Democrats, Statement of the Honorable John
Conyers, Jr. In Opposition to H.R. 1215, the So-Called “Protecting Access to Care Act
of 2017” (2017) (“The bill’s $250,000 aggregate limit for noneconomic damages—an amount
established more than 40 years ago pursuant to a California statute . . . .”); Leonard J. Nelson III et
al., Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice Cases, The Milbank Q. (2007). Further, it is unclear where
the $250,000 amount came from in the first place, but the legislature “may have felt that the fixed
$250,000 limit would promote settlements by eliminating the unknown possibility of phenomenal
awards for pain and suffering that can make litigation worth the gamble.” Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 683 (Cal. 1985).
135

The Consumer Price Index and Inflation - Calculate and Graph Inflation Rates, Mathematical
Assoc. of Am., https://www.maa.org/press/periodicals/loci/joma/the-consumer-price-index-andinflation-calculate-and-graph-inflation-rates (last visited Oct. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Consumer Price
Index and Inflation]. This number was reached by using the inflation rate between 1975 and 2017.
Id. The inflation rate formula is as follows: (CPI in 1975/CPI in 2017) x 2017 USD Value = 1975
USD Value. Id. When the historical consumer price index values are inserted into the formula, the
result is this: (53.8/244.524) x $250,000 = $55,004.83. See id.
136

137
Bennet Abosch, The Capping of Non-Economic Damages: Does California’s Micra Statute
Sacrifice Equal Protection for Ineffective Tort Reform?, 29 U. West. L.A. L. Rev. 357, 377 (1998).

Id. (stating in 1998: “By virtue of inflation, the buying power of that money under the cap
has been reduced by almost two-thirds, thereby making the award unreasonable and inadequate.”).
138
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MICRA value is maintained in 2017, the buying power is reduced by almost
eighty percent.139 The longer inflation remains ignored, the more egregious and
insufficient the plaintiff ’s award becomes.140 To properly compensate plaintiffs,
even in the face of damage caps, legislation must be cognizant of inflation.141
Accordingly, any new legislation on the matter should, at a minimum, equate
the 1975 MICRA value to the 2017 valuation, which would be approximately
$1,136,263. 142 Any limitation should also increase each year to account
for inflation.
From a deterrence standpoint, a low damage cap decreases the incentive for
practitioners to take the level of care necessary to avoid accidents.143 Indeed, a
study conducted by Northwestern University examined the effects of damage
caps.144 The study found the adoption of caps results in an average increase of
ten to fifteen percent in adverse patient safety events.145 If physicians need not
pay the full cost of their negligence, then they will be undeterred from engaging
in dangerous activity.146 The $250,000 threshold is simply too low to require
a physician to consider weighing the costs and benefits of certain activity and
does not require a payment of the full cost of negligence in some cases.147 As
any damage cap will structurally limit liability, thereby reducing full payments in
circumstances where damages are immense, those caps need to be large enough
to make physicians weigh the costs and benefits of their potentially dangerous
activities. The $250,000 cap is too low to achieve this goal.148

B. The Simple Concession Approach
The simple concession approach differs from the dormant approach because
it recommends states impose their own damage cap rather than settling for the
$250,000 PACA amount.149 For reasons stated in the previous section, states that
Consumer Price Index and Inflation, supra note 136. This figure was calculated by dividing
the consumer price index data from 1975 by 2017 (53.8/244.524), and multiplying it by 100, to
get the percentage of buying power decrease between the two years. See id.
139

140

Abosch, supra note 137, at 377−78.

141

See id.

Consumer Price Index and Inflation, supra note 136. This number resulted from the inflation
rate calculation. See id. Specifically: (Consumer Price Index in 2017/Consumer Price Index in 1975)
x 1975 USD value = 2017 USD value. See id. When the consumer price index values are inserted
into the formula, it becomes: (244.524/53.8) x $250,000 = $1,136,363.94. See id.
142

143

Shepherd, supra note 60, at 922.

144

See Miller, supra note 44, at 1470−74.

Zenon Zabinski & Bernard Black, The Deterrent Effect of Tort Law: Evidence from Medical
Malpractice Reform 3 (NW Univ. Inst. for Pol’y Res. Working Paper No. 13-xx, 2004), https://
business.illinois.edu/nmiller/mhec/Zabinski.pdf.
145

146

Id.

147

See id.

148

See supra notes 131− 47 and accompanying text.

149

See supra notes 150− 67 and accompanying text.
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choose this option should start, at a minimum, with the 2017 valuation of the
1975 MICRA amount and account for inflation.150 States that have constitutional
provisions prohibiting such legislation must implement constitutional
amendments, which will likely be more difficult than simply passing legislation
on the matter.151

1. Amend the Constitution, if Necessary
Wyoming is one state that will require a constitutional amendment.152 The
Wyoming Constitution currently provides that “[n]o law shall be enacted limiting
the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the injury or death of any
person.”153 To amend the Wyoming Constitution, a bill must pass both houses
and be presented to the governor for signature.154 Then, the proposed amendment
must receive a majority of the total votes cast in the general election.155
In 2015, the Wyoming State Legislature sought to amend this constitutional
provision by limiting noneconomic damages in health care provider lawsuits
to $500,000.156 The 2015 proposal failed.157 There is relatively little legislative
history stating why the 2015 proposal failed,158 but a similar bill failed in 2003
because of legislative uncertainty.159 Addressing the failed 2003 proposal, United
States Senator Michael B. Enzi stated,
My own State, Wyoming, had a lively legislative debate on
medical liability reform this year, but we have a constitutional
amendment that prohibits limits on the amounts that can be
recovered through lawsuits. The Wyoming Senate considered
150

See supra notes 131− 47 and accompanying text.

See Robert B. Keiter, The Wyoming State Constitution 20 (G. Alan Tarr, 2nd ed.
2017) (“If the ratification requirement were simply a majority of the votes cast on the amendment,
then thirty-one more amendments would have been added to the [Wyoming] constitution.”).
In Wyoming, a proposed constitutional amendment must be ratified by the majority of votes in
the electorate, not by those voting on the amendment. State ex rel. Blair v. Brooks, 99 P. 874, 874
(Wyo. 1909).
151

152

See Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4.

153

Id.

154

Keiter, supra note 151, at 20; Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 521 (Wyo. 2000).

Wyo. Const. art. 20, § 1. The phrase “electors” is interpreted to mean those persons “who
are entitled to vote” in the general election. Sch. Dist. Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10, in the Cty. of
Campbell v. Cook, 424 P.2d 751, 757 (Wyo. 1967).
155

156

HJ0011, 63rd Leg., 2015 Gen. Sess. (Wyo. 2015).

157

Wyo. Legis. Serv. Off., Status of Bills, HJ0011, 63rd Leg., 2015 Gen. Sess. (2015).

See Debora A. Person, Legislative Histories and the Practice of Statutory Interpretation in
Wyoming, 10 Wyo. L. Rev. 559, 568 (2010) (“Wyoming’s lack of published legislative material has
been a hindrance to researching legislative histories and searching out legislative intent.”).
158

159

See 108th Cong. Rec. 20575 (2003).
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a bill to amend our State’s constitution . . . the bill died in a
tie vote on the Wyoming Senate floor. According to one of the
sponsors of the bill, Senator Charlie Scott, one of the biggest
obstacles to passage was the uncertainty surrounding this new
idea. . . . No one knew . . . how much injured patients would
recover compared to what they recover now. Senator Scott
wrote me to say that federal support for finding answers to these
questions might help the bill’s sponsors sufficiently respond to
the legitimate concerns of their fellow Wyoming legislators.160
PACA should not serve as a model for the Wyoming State Legislature, but rather
as incentive to pass a constitutional amendment in both houses.161 Imposing a cap
higher than PACA’s $250,000 amount is necessary to ensure injured plaintiffs will
be able to recover as much as they can under the current model. A cap that begins
with the 2017 valuation of the 1975 MICRA amount and accounts for inflation
is necessary to guarantee such an outcome.162 The Wyoming State Legislature
should have no difficulty passing legislation of this kind in both houses given their
previous attempts to do so. The concern about adequate plaintiff recovery that
attached to the prior legislation should propel legislation of this kind to be passed.
Wyoming may have difficulty with the second requirement: convincing a
majority of voters that such legislation is beneficial.163 In 2004, Wyoming voters
rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that would have allowed legislation
capping noneconomic damages.164 The proposal was defeated by a vote of 50.35%
to 49.65%.165 A new constitutional amendment may be perceived publicly as an
overstepping of political values, which is why it is important to be open and
honest with constituents in explaining why the constitutional amendment is

160

Id.

161

See supra notes 131– 47 and accompanying text.

Id. Adopting the dormant approach would decrease the amount plaintiffs could recover in
Wyoming compared to what they have the potential to recover now since Wyoming law currently
does not limit recovery of damages. See supra notes 131– 47 and accompanying text; Wyo. Const.
art. 10, § 4(a) (“No law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing
injury or death of any person.”).
162

163
To reiterate, damage caps are not generally beneficial. See supra notes 130– 48 and
accompanying text. However, if federal preemption is inevitable, states should concede on their own
terms to protect plaintiffs. See supra notes 127– 62 and accompanying text; infra notes 167–208 and
accompanying text.
164
Wyoming Secretary of State, 2004 General Election Results, Statewide Candidates,
Judicial Retentions, Constitutional Amendments and Total Ballots Cast 8, Constitutional
Amendment D.

Id.; see also Becky Bohrer, Voters reject caps on malpractice damage awards, The Billings
Gazette, Nov. 2, 2004, http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming/voters-rejectcaps-on-malpractice-damage-awards/article_6851d2cf-b2db-574d-9941-f05b12689d9b.html.
165
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necessary: to adequately compensate plaintiffs by preempting or circumventing
PACA’s intrusion into this traditional state law area.166
For plaintiffs to receive the most protection, though, Wyoming and similarly
situated states should select the sovereign concession approach, which goes beyond
the basic tenets of the simple concession approach.167

C. The Sovereign Concession Approach
The sovereign concession approach adopts the basic tenets of the simple
concession because it would also require a constitutional amendment in some
states.168 However, the sovereign concession approach moves beyond the simple
concession approach because it urges statutes to include enormously large
noneconomic damage limitations, categorically exempt nursing homes and cases
resulting in death or disfigurement, and to implement or activate a PCF.169
This approach aligns more closely with the objectives of tort law than the other
approaches while also maintaining state sovereignty in light of federal preemption
in this traditional state law area.

1. Impose an Unusually High Limitation on Noneconomic Damages
The sovereign concession approach requires the cap to be unusually high in
terms of traditional thresholds.170 Though the amount will be somewhat arbitrary,
as is the nature of noneconomic damage limitations,171 the threshold should reflect
both the importance and purpose of noneconomic damages and the institutional
values reflected in the preempted states’ constitutions.172
166
See supra notes 94 –95 and accompanying text. Any state that does not have some cap on
noneconomic damages directly conflicts with Congress’s objective in PACA of imposing a cap in
every state. See supra notes 109 –26 and accompanying text. This conflict requires states that do not
have noneconomic damage caps on or before the enactment of PACA to be preempted with the
$250,000 cap. See supra notes 109–26 and accompanying text. The only way for states to stop the
preemption is to preempt or circumvent the preemption by imposing their own caps. See supra notes
109–26 and accompanying text.
167

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

168

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.

169

See infra notes 170–208 and accompanying text.

170

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

Lucas v. United States, 757 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Tex. 1988) (citing Smith v. Dep’t. of Ins., 507
So.2d 1080, 1088−89 (Fl. 1987) (acknowledging that, if the legislature could cap recovery at one
amount, there is no reason why it could not cap the recovery at some other figure, including $1).
171

See infra notes 173 –79 and accompanying text. The institutional value reflected
in constitutions, prohibiting such limitations, is that states do not want to limit the amount a
plaintiff can recover. See John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American
Tort Law, 36 Rutgers L. J. 1159, 1168 (2005) (“[D]emocratic dissatisfaction with statutory caps
on damages in death cases produced a wave of constitutional provisions and amendments.”). State
constitutions often contain provisions that are expressive of the state’s values. See Justin R. Long,
172
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The importance of noneconomic damages becomes evident when asking
oneself whether an injured patient’s recovery should be based solely on the
patient’s income and wealth.173 This importance is emulated in Wyoming’s
constitutional provision prohibiting damage caps.174 The provision also reflects
the basic common-law tenet that plaintiffs receive all noneconomic damages
awarded by the fact-finder.175 Though any limitation on noneconomic damage
makes the tenet of compensation less effective, it is still possible to conceive of
a limitation that will allow a plaintiff to receive all, if not most, of a jury award
given the infrequency of large medical malpractice verdicts in the state.176 Simply
put, Wyoming can impose a limitation that is high enough to meet foreseeable
needs of even the most injured plaintiffs while still meeting the requirements of
PACA. The congressional requirement that every state impose a noneconomic
damage limitation, coupled with the arbitrary nature of such caps, effectively
authorizes imposition of a seemingly facetious cap upwards of $10 million.
To illustrate, a $10 million damage cap would satisfy the requirements of
PACA because it would be an imposition of damage caps.177 The $10 million
cap would also meet the foreseeable needs of the most injured Wyoming
plaintiffs because Wyoming’s largest medical malpractice verdict is currently
$9 million.178 When the verdict was announced, many Wyomingites classified
it as an anomaly,179 which demonstrates that the foreseeable needs of Wyoming
State Constitutions as Interactive Expressions of Fundamental Values, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1739, 1744
(2010) (“[T]he expressive power of the norms embedded in the constitutional text itself draws
a state polity together, creating a community of shared commitments to the values in the text.”).
Accordingly, any change in the law in this regard should continue to reflect such institutional
values, since the purpose of amending the constitutions is not to override the institutional value
itself, but rather to ensure its perpetuity in light of federal preemption. See supra note 163 and
accompanying text.
173
The Republican Attack, supra note 71, at 707 (“The importance of these nonpecuniary
losses can be seen by asking yourself whether you would be indifferent or even nearly indifferent
between an uninjured state and a severely injured state, such as paraplegia, blindness, or severe brain
damage, so long as your income and wealth remained constant.”).
174

Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4(a).

175

The Republican Attack, supra note 71, at 707.

Scott Harper, Largest Medical Malpractice Verdict in Wyoming History, Trial Law. C. (June
9, 2017), https://www.triallawyerscollege.org/blog/?p=5831 (After a Wyoming jury awarded a
$9 million verdict, the highest verdict in the history of Wyoming, Robert Teideken, a Wyoming
attorney said, “Two blocks away from the federal courthouse where the verdict you are asking me
about occurred, there was a defense verdict in a medical malpractice case the next week. We never
hear about those.”).
176

177

H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. § 4(e) (2017).

Prager v. Campbell Cty. Mem. Hosp., 731 F.3d 1046, 1053 (10th Cir. 2013). The jury
awarded Mr. Prager, the plaintiff, $7 million in compensatory damages and Mrs. Prager, the
plaintiff ’s wife, $2 million for loss of consortium. Id.
178

See Harper, supra note 176. Wyoming Governor Matthew H. Mead responded to
the verdict by saying it got his attention, but he did not believe one verdict warranted an overreaction. Id.
179
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plaintiffs will be satisfied with such an amount. By meeting foreseeable needs of
Wyoming plaintiffs, the $10 million amount also comports with the underlying
principles of noneconomic damages because it will adequately compensate most
Wyoming plaintiffs.

2. Exempt Nursing Homes and Cases Resulting in Death
or Disfigurement
Sovereign concessions statutes should also exempt nursing homes from the
limitation on noneconomic damages. The first (and perhaps most obvious) reason
for exempting this class of plaintiffs is because the type of litigation these plaintiffs
raise is customarily different from the typical medical malpractice claim.180 The
typical malpractice case involves an improper or failed diagnosis, while nursing
home cases generally involve emotional and sexual abuse, bedsores, and neglect.181
Most importantly, though, nursing home patients are generally vulnerable,
“elderly Medicaid recipients, often with dementia or Alzheimer’s disease,” and are
widely cut-off from the outside world.182 Given the vulnerability of nursing home
plaintiffs in combination with the reality that noneconomic damage awards make
up a relatively large portion of any successful nursing home claim, the importance
of establishing an exception for this class of plaintiffs is readily apparent.183 A cap
on noneconomic damages that includes nursing homes would erect a dangerous
barrier to the courtroom for such plaintiffs because it would make it nearly
impossible for victims of nursing home negligence to find attorneys willing to
represent them.184 Stated bluntly, “[t]he real victims of caps on noneconomic
damages are our most vulnerable citizens, our mothers and grandmothers who
are victimized by profit driven corporate nursing home chains.”185
States preempting or circumventing PACA should also exempt cases resulting
in death or disfigurement for two reasons. First, a statute that neglects to exempt
cases resulting in death or disfigurement effectively claims that all injuries,
regardless of severity, are not worth more than $250,000.186 Such legislation
180

Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected, supra note 63, at 344.

181

Id.

Michael L. Rustad, Heart of Stone: What is Revealed About the Attitude of Compassionate
Conservatives Toward Nursing Home Practices, Tort Reform, and Noneconomic Damages, 35 N.M.L.
Rev. 337, 338 (2005).
182

183
Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected, supra note 63, at 344 (“[E]conomic damages tend to
constitute a relatively small portion of nursing home awards, and noneconomic damages tend to
constitute a relatively large portion.”).
184

Id. at 390.

185

Id. at 390−91.

Ralph Peeples & Catherine T. Harris, Learning to Crawl: The Use of Voluntary Caps on
Damages in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 54 Cath. U. L. Rev. 703, 721 (2005) (discussing how
damage limitations are problematic because not all injuries or plaintiffs are alike).
186
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allows differential treatment for less serious injuries but not more serious injuries,
where differential treatment is perhaps more justified due to the severity of the
injury.187 States who fail to implement exemptions of this kind will penalize the
most injured victims of medical malpractice.188 Second, the chances of a cap
reducing a claimant’s recovery increase with the severity of the injury.189 In fact,
empirical evidence indicates claimants with the most catastrophic injuries are at
the highest risk of inadequate compensation.190 Preempted states should exempt
cases resulting in death or disfigurement or risk marginalizing victims of the most
egregious malpractice.191

3. Implement or Activate a PCF
A PCF “offer[s] insurance for medical malpractice liability that exceeds the
specified threshold amounts covered by” an insurance policy.192 A PCF works with
the malpractice insurance market to place a surcharge on malpractice insurance
premiums that will recycle into the fund.193 If a plaintiff is awarded damages that
exceed the statutory limit, the plaintiff is paid the excess amount from the PCF so
long as the doctor or hospital who was found liable is a participating member in
the fund.194 A PCF is the best way to simultaneously protect insurance providers
against future liabilities and to allow plaintiffs to collect sufficient compensation
on a successful claim.195 In some states, participation in the fund is voluntary,
while other states mandate participation.196 Wyoming must mandate participation
in the fund because Wyoming has only one insurance provider. 197 If Wyoming
allows voluntary participation, the sole provider may choose not to participate
and the activation of the fund would be fruitless.

187

Id.

188

Id.

189

Id.

David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts in
California, 23 Health Aff. 54, 55 (2004); see also Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in
Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the Compensation Fair?, 24 L. & Soc’y Rev. 997 (1990).
190

191
Rustad, Neglecting the Neglected, supra note 63, at 350 (“An astonishing 65% of plaintiffs in
catastrophic brain damage cases had their awards reduced due to California’s MICRA cap.”).
192

Sloan, supra note 42 at 247.

193

Gereau, supra note 127.

194

Id.

Ed Schrero, Note, Patient Compensation Funds: Legislative Responses to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, 5 Am. J. L. & Med. 175, 179 (1979).
195

196

Gereau, supra note 127.

Wyoming insurance provider seeks almost 50-percent rate hike, Casper Star Tribune, Aug. 3,
2017, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/wyoming-insurance-provider-seeks-almost-percent-rate-hike/article_31d5c02f-3dbd-5d0a-8f70-fdc92a7764eb.html. As of November 9,
2017, Blue Cross Blue Shield was the only provider of health insurance in Wyoming. Id.
197
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Wyoming created a PCF in 1977 under the Medical Liability Compensation
Account.198 The account is currently inactive.199 In theory, the PCF is regulated
by the account’s commissioner who uses invested monies to purchase insurance
for the PCF and its obligations.200 Participation in the fund is presently voluntary
and allows qualified physicians to pay an annual surcharge determined by the
commissioner.201 To qualify as a participant in the fund, a physician must carry
liability insurance coverage of at least $50,000 per occurrence and pay an annual
surcharge.202 Wyoming must activate the PCF and amend the statute to require
participation given the one-provider environment.
However, PCFs have two critical disadvantages. First, PCFs “arguably insulate
the most negligent providers” because they only become applicable when damage
awards exceed the statutory threshold.203 Second, given the limited nature of the
fund, a plaintiff may have to wait longer to receive damage awards.204 For instance,
most states that currently have active funds permit a fixed dollar amount to be
paid to a single plaintiff in a given year.205 Therefore, any award that is drawn
from the PCF would be paid in installments over a period of years to guarantee
funds are available in the event of a second verdict in excess of the limitation.206
While this is not ideal, it is favored over the situation where a meritorious plaintiff
is unable to find representation because of a damage cap.207 Nevertheless, the two
disadvantages of a PCF become nearly inapposite if an unusually high threshold
is imposed. A $10 million threshold would not insulate the most negligent
providers as much as a $250,000 limitation would, making the first disadvantage
less cautionary. Additionally, it is improbable that two verdicts exceeding $10
million would be awarded in Wyoming within a given year considering Wyoming
does not have a history with verdicts exceeding the proposed threshold amount.208
Because it is unlikely two verdicts in excess of the amount would need to be
paid out of the PCF within the same year, the second disadvantage becomes less
cautionary as well.

198

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-33-105 (2008).

Id. The American Medical Association claims Wyoming’s medical liability compensation
account has never been implemented. Gereau, supra note 127; Sloan, supra note 42.
199

200

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-33-105(a).

201

Id. § 26-33-105(c).

202

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 26-33-102 (1983).

203

Schrero, supra note 195, at 187.

204

Id. at 181.

205

Id.

206

Id.

207

See supra note 63 and accompanying text.

208

Harper, supra note 176.
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4. The Sovereign Concession Approach Summary
To conclude, the sovereign concession approach requires states to go beyond
the guidelines set forth in the simple concession approach. Specifically, states should
impose an unconventionally high cap on noneconomic damages and account for
inflation, exempt cases resulting in death or disfigurement, categorically exempt
nursing homes, and mandate participation in an active PCF to ensure additional
compensation will be available if necessary.

VI. Conclusion
Even though medical malpractice was the third-leading cause of death in
2016,209 some proponents advocate for medical malpractice reform to constrain
the civil litigation system.210 The debate between reformers and preservers,
physicians and doctors, and republicans and democrats has yet to produce
federal legislation limiting noneconomic damages despite numerous proposals.211
The Holy Grail for Republicans has been, and will continue to be, a cap on
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice suits,212 and the 115th Congress is
arguably the closest Congress has ever come to federalizing medical malpractice
claims. This Comment argues the passage of PACA is inevitable.213 If, for some
reason, PACA were to stall or fail in this session, Congress will undoubtedly
propose and pass similar legislation during the current span of Republican-control.
It is unimaginable that a business-friendly President and a Republican-controlled
Congress will let 2018 slip away without successfully passing one health care bill,
and the time for medical malpractice reform seems to be now.
States should prepare accordingly to ensure their citizens are not left without
an adequate remedy when catastrophic medical malpractice incidents occur.
States that have yet to enact noneconomic damage limitations, and especially
states similarly situated to Wyoming,214 should follow the guidelines set forth
in the sovereign concession approach.215 Without such measures, “the medical
malpractice system [will become] a failure, for most of the people, most of the
time,” at least as it pertains to fulfilling the objectives of compensation and
deterrence.216 This failure would an actual and undebatable crisis. To avoid

209

See Terhune, supra note 1.

210

See supra notes 50 – 60 and accompanying text.

Matray, supra note 24 (“Attempts to enact federal noneconomic damage caps have proven
fruitless . . . .”); see also supra notes 86 – 88 and accompanying text.
211

212

Id.

213

Id.

214

See supra note 69 –70.

215

See supra notes 168–208 and accompanying text.

216

Peeples & Harris, supra note 186, at 714.
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such an outcome, states should pass enormously large noneconomic damage
limitations, categorically exempt instances that result in death or disfigurement
and nursing homes, and require the implementation or activation of a PCF.217 By
doing so, states will protect plaintiffs while adhering to the objectives of tort law
and medical malpractice.

217

Id.
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